A number of recent papers have addressed the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions so as to maximize revenue, most of which assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction. This does not realistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in practice, in which bidders pay the next-highest bid for keywords that they are allocated. Towards the goal of more realistically modelling these auctions, we introduce the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders' payments are determined by the GSP mechanism.
Introduction
The rising economic importance of online sponsored search advertising has led to a great deal of research focused on developing its theoretical underpinnings. (See, e.g., [18] for a survey). Since search engines such as Google, Yahoo! and MSN depend on sponsored search for a significant fraction of their revenue, a key problem is how to optimally allocate ads to keywords (user searches) so as to maximize search engine revenue [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 15, 20, 21, 24] . Most of the research on the dynamic version of this problem assumes that once the participants in each keyword auction are determined, the pricing is done via a first-price auction; in other words, bidders pay what they bid. This does not realistically model the standard mechanism used by search engines, called the Generalized Second Price mechanism (GSP) [10, 25] .
In an attempt to model reality more closely, we study the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, which is the analogue of the above allocation problem when bidders' payments are determined by the GSP mechanism and there is only one slot for each keyword. The GSP mechanism for a given keyword auction reduces to a second-price auction when there is one slot per keyword -given the participants in the auction, it allocates the advertisement slot to the highest bidder, charging that bidder the bid of the second-highest bidder.
In the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, we assume that there is a set of keywords U and a set of bidders V , where each bidder v ∈ V has a known daily budget B v and a non-negative bid b u,v for every keyword u ∈ U . The keywords are ordered by their arrival time, and as each keyword arrives, the algorithm (i.e., the search engine) chooses the bidders to participate in that particular auction and runs a second-price auction with respect to those participants. Thus, instead of selecting one bidder for each keyword, two bidders need to be selected by the algorithm. Of these two bidders, the bidder with the higher bid (where bids are always reduced to the minimum of the actual bid and the bidders' remaining budget) is allocated that keyword's advertisement slot at the price of the other bid.
This process results in an allocation and pricing of the advertisement slots associated with each of the keywords. The goal is to select the bidders participating in each auction to maximize the total profit extracted by the algorithm. For an example instance of this problem, see Figure 1 .
We note that for simplicity of presentation we have chosen to present the model, the algorithms and the results as if the bidders are competing for a single slot. Obviously, our hardness results hold for the multi-slot problem as well.
Our Results
We begin by considering the offline version of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which the algorithm knows all of the original bids of the bidders (Section 3). Our main result here is that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal solution to this problem to within a factor better than m/R min , where m is the number of keywords and R min ≥ 1 is a constant independent of m such that no bidder bids more than 1/R min of its initial budget on any keyword. Thus, even when bids are small compared to budgets, it is not possible in the worst case to get a good approximation to the optimal revenue. (We show that it is trivial to get a matching approximation algorithm.) This result stands in sharp contrast to the standard First-Price Ad Auctions problem, for which there is a 4/3-approximation to the offline problem [6, 24] (even for R min = 1), and an e/(e − 1)-competitive algorithm to the online problem when bids are small compared to budgets [5, 21] (i.e., as R min → ∞).
We then turn our attention to a theoretically appealing special case that we call Second-Price Matching. In this version of the problem, all bids are either 0 or 1 and all budgets are 1. As before, the keywords are ordered by arrival time, and a keyword u can be matched to a bidder v with a profit of 1 only if b u,v = 1, there is a distinct bidder v with b u,v = 1, and neither v nor v has been matched to a keyword that arrived before u. For an example instance of this problem, see Figure 2 .
Recall that for First-Price Matching or, as we know and love it, maximum bipartite matching, the offline problem can of course be solved optimally in polynomial time, whereas for the online problem we have the trivial 2-competitive deterministic greedy algorithm and the celebrated e/(e − 1)-competitive randomized algorithm due to Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani [16] , both of which are best possible.
In contrast, we show that the Second-Price Matching problem is APX-hard (Section 4.1). We also give a 2-approximation algorithm for the offline problem (Section 4.2). We then turn to the online version of the problem. Here, we show that no deterministic online algorithm can get a competitive ratio better than m, where m is the number of keywords in the instance and that no randomized online algorithm can get a competitive ratio better than 2 (Section 5.1). On the other hand, we present a randomized online algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of 4 √ e/( √ e − 1) ≈ 5.08 (Section 5.2). To obtain this competitive ratio, we prove a generalization of the result due to Karp The number immediately to the right of each bidder represents its remaining budget, and the number next to each edge connecting a bidder to a keyword represents the bid of that bidder for that keyword. Figure 1(a) shows the situation when the first keyword arrives. For this keyword, the search engine selects the first bidder, whose bid is 4, and the third bidder, whose bid is 3. The keyword is allocated to the first bidder at a price of 3, thereby reducing that bidder's budget by 3. Figure 1(b) shows the situation when the second keyword arrives. The first and fourth bidders are selected, and the keyword is allocated to the fourth bidder at a price of 2, thereby reducing its remaining budget to 2. As each keyword arrives, the bid of a bidder for that keyword is adjusted to the minimum of its original bid and its remaining budget. Thus, for example, when the third keyword arrives, as shown in Figure 1 (c), the bid of the first bidder for that keyword is adjusted from its original value of 6 down to 3 since that is its remaining budget. The two bidders then selected are the first and the second, and the keyword is allocated to the second bidder at a price of 3.
Figure 2: An example of the Second-Price Matching problem: The nodes in U are keywords, the nodes in V are bidders, and an edge (u, v) represents the fact that bidder v bids 1 for keyword u. The budget of each bidder is 1. In this example, neither of the last two keywords can be matched for profit. In particular, the fourth keyword cannot be matched for profit because it has only one neighbor that is not already matched (and thus no bidder available to act as a second-price bidder).
algorithm for online bipartite matching achieves a competitive ratio of e/(e − 1).
Related Work
As discussed above, the related First-Price Ad Auctions problem 1 has received a fair amount of attention. Mehta et al. [21] presented an algorithm for the online version that achieves an optimal competitive ratio of e/(e−1) for the case when the bids are much smaller than the budgets (i.e., when R min → ∞), a result also proved by Buchbinder et al. [5] . When there is no restriction on the values of the bids relative to the budgets (i.e., when R min can be as low as 1), the best known competitive ratio is 2 [19] . For the offline version of the problem, a sequence of papers [19, 2, 11, 3, 24, 6] culminating in a paper by Chakrabarty and Goel, and independently, a paper by Srinivasan, show that the offline problem can be approximated to within a factor of 4/(4 − 1/R min ) and that there is no polynomial time approximation algorithm that achieves a ratio better than 16/15 unless P = N P [6] . The most closely related papers to this one are the works of Abrams, Mendelevitch and Tomlin [1] , and of Goel, Mahdian, Nazerzadeh and Saberi [14] . The latter looks at the online allocation problem when the search engine is committed to charging under the GSP scheme, with multiple slots per keyword. They study two models, both of which differ from the model studied in this paper, even for one slot. Their first model, called the strict model, allows a bidder's bid to be above his remaining budget, as long as the remaining budget is strictly positive. However, as in our model, when a bidder is allocated a slot, that bidder is never charged more than his remaining budget. Thus, in the strict model, a bidder v with a negligible amount of remaining budget can In this example, R min is equal to a constant c, i.e., every bid is at most 1/c of the budget of the bidder. In the strict model, all keywords except the first must be allocated to the second bidder at a price of k (or the remaining budget if it's smaller). Thus, the total profit on this input for the strict model is at most ck + 3. On the other hand, in our model, if we allocate the first keyword to the second bidder, and then the next c − 1 keywords to the second bidder, that bidder's budget is reduced to k − 1. Thus, all of the remaining keywords can be allocated to the lower bidder at a price of k − 1, for a total revenue exceeding ck(k − 1). For k large, this ratio is Ω(k) = Ω(m).
keep his bids high indefinitely, and as long as bidder v is never allocated another slot, this high bid can determine the prices other bidders pay on many keywords. 2 Their second model, called the non-strict model, differs from the strict model in that bidders can keep their bids positive even after their budget is depleted. Thus, even after a bidder's budget is depleted, that bidder can determine the prices that other bidders pay on keywords indefinitely. However, a bidder is never charged more than his remaining budget for a slot. Therefore, if a bidder is allocated a slot after his budget is fully depleted, it gets the slot for free.
Under the assumption that bids are small compared to budgets, Goel et al. present a e/(e − 1)-competitive algorithm for the non-strict model and a 3-competitive algorithm for the strict model. They also show that OP T strict ≤ OP T non−strict ≤ 2OP T strict , where these quantities refer to the optimal offline revenue of the search engine in their models. Their algorithms build on the linear programming formulation of Abrams et al. [1] for the offline version of the strict model.
Interestingly, neither of their models or our model completely dominates the others in terms of the optimal offline revenue. However, it is fairly easy to show that neither OP T strict nor OP T non−strict are ever more than a constant factor larger than the optimal offline revenue from our model (see Appendix A for a proof of this). On the other hand, the optimal offline revenue in our model can be Ω(m) times as big as OP T non−strict and OP T strict , where m is the number of keywords, and this holds even when R min is a large constant c (see Figure 3) . This is not surprising, given the strong hardness of approximation in our model, versus the fact that constant factor approximations are available, even online, in theirs.
Notice also, that for the special case of Second-Price Matching the strict model and our model are identical, whereas the non-strict model reduces to standard maximum matching (on all those keywords which have at least two bidders bidding on them).
We feel that our model, in which bidders are not allowed to bid more than their remaining budget, is more natural then the strict and non-strict models. It seems inherently unfair that a bidder with negligible or no budget should be able to indefinitely set high prices for other bidders. We recognize of course that there may be technical issues involving the scale and distributed nature of search engines that could make it difficult to implement our model precisely.
Model and Notation
We define the Second-Price Ad Auctions (2PAA) problem formally as follows. The input is a set of ordered keywords U and bidders V . Each bidder v ∈ V has a budget B v and a nonnegative bid b u,v for every keyword u ∈ U . We assume that all of bidder v's bids b u,v are less than or equal to B v .
Let B v (t) be the remaining budget of bidder v immediately after the t-th keyword is processed (so B v (0) = B v for all v), and let b u,v (t) = min(b u,v , B v (t)). (Both quantities are defined inductively.) A solution (or second-price matching) to 2PAA chooses for the t-th keyword u a pair of bidders v 1 and v 2 such that b u,v 1 (t − 1) ≥ b u,v 2 (t − 1), allocates the slot for keyword u to bidder v 1 and charges bidder v 1 a price of p(t) = b u,v 2 (t − 1), the bid of v 2 . (We say that v 1 acts as the first-price bidder for u and v 2 acts as the second-price bidder for u.) The budget of v 1 is then reduced by p(t), so
. The final value of the solution is t p(t), and the goal is to find a feasible solution of maximum value.
In the offline version of the problem, all of the bids are known to the algorithm beforehand, whereas in the online version of the problem, keyword u and the bids b u,v for each v ∈ V are revealed only when keyword u arrives, at which point the algorithm must irrevocably map u to a pair of bidders without knowing the bids for the keywords that will arrive later.
The special case referred to as Second-Price Matching (2PM) is the special case where b u,v is either 0 or 1 for all (u, v) pairs and B v = 1 for all v. Perhaps, however, it is more intuitive to think of it as a variant on maximum bipartite matching. Viewing it this way, the input is a bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V, E), and the vertices in U must be matched, in order, to the vertices in V such that the profit of matching u ∈ U to v ∈ V is 1 if and only if there is at least one additional vertex v ∈ V that is a neighbor of u and is unmatched at that time.
Note that in 2PM, a keyword can only be allocated for profit if its degree is at least two. Therefore, we assume without loss of generality that for all inputs of 2PM, the degree of every keyword is is at least two.
For an input to 2PAA, let R min = min u,v B v /b u,v , and let m = |U | be the number of keywords.
Hardness of Approximation of 2PAA
In this section, we show that it is NP-hard to approximate 2PAA to a factor better than m/R min for any constant R min independent of m (Theorem 1) and provide a trivial algorithm with an approximation guarantee that meets this factor. For a constant c ≥ 1, let 2PAA(c) be the version of 2PAA in which we are promised that R min ≥ c. The proof of the following theorem (presented in full in Appendix C.1) uses a gadget similar to the instance presented in Figure 3 . This gadget exploits the sensitivity of the problem to small changes in budget. In particular, if the budget of a key bidder is reduced by a small amount, then the optimal revenue is much higher than if it is not reduced. We prove our inapproximability result by setting up the reduction so that the budget of this bidder is reduced if and only if the answer to the problem we reduce from is "yes." Proof. For each keyword u ∈ U , let s u be the second-highest bid for u. Consider the algorithm that selects the c keywords with the highest values of s u and then allocates these keywords to get s u for each of them (i.e., chooses the two highest bidders for u). Since no bidder bids more than 1/c of its budget for any keyword, no bids are reduced from their original values during this allocation. Hence, the profit of this allocation is at least (c/m) u∈U s u . Since the value of the optimal solution cannot be larger than u∈U s u , it follows that this is an m/c-approximation to 2PAA(c).
Offline Second-Price Matching
In this section, we turn our attention to the offline version of the special case of Second-Price Matching (2PM). First, in Section 4.1, we show that 2PM is APX-hard. This stands in contrast to the maximum matching problem, the corresponding special case of the First-Price Ad Auctions problem, which is solvable in polynomial time. Second, in Section 4.2, we give a 2-approximation for 2PM.
Hardness of Approximation
To prove our hardness result for 2PM, we use the following result due to Chlebík and Chelbíková.
Theorem 3 (Chlebík and Chelbíková [8] ). It is NP-hard to approximate Vertex Cover on 4-regular graphs to within 53/52.
The precise statement of our hardness result is the following theorem. 
A 2-Approximation Algorithm
Consider an instance G = (U ∪ V, E) of the 2PM problem. We provide an algorithm that first finds a maximum matching f : U → V and then uses f to return a second-price matching that contains at least half of the keywords matched by f . 3 Given a matching f , call an edge (u, v) ∈ E such that f (u) = v an up-edge if v is matched by f and f −1 (v) arrives before u, and a down-edge otherwise. Recall that we have assumed without loss of generality that the degree of every keyword in U is at least two. Therefore, every keyword u ∈ U that is matched by f must have at least one up-edge or down-edge. Theorem 5 shows that the following algorithm, called ReverseMatch, is a 2-approximation for 2PM.
ReverseMatch Algorithm:
Initialization: Find an arbitrary maximum matching f : U → V on G. Constructing a 2nd-price matching: Consider the matched keywords in reverse order of their arrival. For each keyword u:
If keyword u is adjacent to a down-edge (u, v): Assign keyword u to bidder f (u) (with v acting as the second-price bidder). Else:
Choose an arbitrary bidder v that is adjacent to keyword u.
Assign keyword u to bidder f (u) (with v acting as the second-price bidder).
Theorem 5. The ReverseMatch algorithm is a 2-approximation.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
Online Second-Price Matching
In this section, we consider the online 2PM problem, in which the keywords arrive one-by-one and must be matched by the algorithm as they arrive. We start, in Section 5.1, by giving a simple lower bound showing that no deterministic algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than m, the number of keywords. Then we move to randomized online algorithms and show that no randomized algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than 2. In Section 5.2, we provide a randomized online algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of 4 √ e/( √ e − 1) ≈ 5.083.
Lower Bounds
The following theorem establishes our lower bound on deterministic algorithms, which matches the trivial algorithm of arbitrarily allocating the first keyword to arrive, and refusing to allocate any of the remaining keywords.
Theorem 6. For any m, there is an adversary that creates a graph with m keywords that forces any deterministic algorithm to get a competitive ratio no better than 1/m.
Proof. The adversary shows the algorithm a single keyword (keyword 1) that has two adjacent bidders, a 1 and b 2 . If the algorithm does not match keyword 1 at all, a new keyword 2 arrives that is adjacent to two new bidders a 2 and b 2 . The adversary continues in this way until either m keywords arrive or the algorithm matches a keyword k < m. In the first case, the algorithm's performance is at most 1 (because it might match keyword m), whereas the adversary can match all m keywords. Hence, the ratio is at most 1/m.
In the second case, the adversary continues as follows. Suppose without loss of generality that the algorithm matches keyword k to a k . Then each keyword i, for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ m, has one edge to a k and one edge to a new bidder c k . Since the algorithm cannot match any of these keywords for a profit, its performance is 1. The adversary can clearly match each keyword i for profit, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and if it matches keyword k to b k , then it can use a k as a second-price bidder for the remaining keywords to match them all to the c i 's for profit. Hence, the adversary can construct a second-price matching of size at least m.
The following theorem establishes our lower bound of 2 for any (randomized) online algorithm for 2PM.
Theorem 7. The competitive ratio of any randomized algorithm for 2PM must be at least 2.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
A Randomized Competitive Algorithm
In this section, we provide an algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of 2 √ e/( √ e − 1) ≈ 5.083. The result builds on a new generalization of the result that the Ranking algorithm for online bipartite matching achieves a competitive ratio of e/(e − 1) ≈ The online bipartite matching problem is merely the first-price version of 2PM, i.e., the problem in which there is no requirement for there to exist a second-price bidder to get a profit of 1 for a match. The Ranking algorithm chooses a random permutation on the bidders V and uses that to choose matches for the keywords U as they arrive. This is described more precisely below.
Ranking Algorithm: Initialization: Choose a random permutation (ranking) σ of the bidders V . Online Matching: Upon arrival of keyword u ∈ U :
Let N (u) be the set of neighbors of u that have not been matched yet. If N (u) = ∅, match u to the bidder v ∈ N (u) that minimizes σ(v).
Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani, and Goel and Mehta prove the following result. In order to state our generalization of this result, we define the notion of a left k-copy of a bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V, E). Intuitively, a left k-copy of G makes k copies of each keyword u ∈ U such that the neighborhood of a copy of u is the same as the neighborhood of u. More precisely, we have the following definition.
Definition 9. Given a bipartite graph G = (U G ∪ V, E G ), define a left k-copy of G to be a graph H = (U H ∪ V, E H ) for which |U H | = k|U G | and for which there exists a map ζ : U H → U G such that
• for each u G ∈ U G there are exactly k vertices u H ∈ U H such that ζ(u H ) = u G , and
Our generalization of Theorem 8 describes the competitive ratio of Ranking on a graph H that is a k-copy of G. It's proof, presented in Appendix B, is a modification to the proof of Theorem 8 presented by Birnbaum and Mathieu [4] .
Theorem 10. Let G = (U G ∪ V, E G ) be a bipartite graph that has a maximum matching of size OP T 1P , and let H = (U H ∪ V, E H ) be a left k-copy of G. Then the expected size of the matching returned by Ranking on H is at least
Proof. See Appendix B.
Using this result, we are able to prove that the following algorithm, called RankingSimulate, achieves a competitive ratio of 4 √ e/( √ e − 1).
RankingSimulate Algorithm:
Initialization: Set M , the set of matched bidders, to ∅. Set R, the set of reserved bidders, to ∅. With probability 1/2, match u to v 1 , add v 1 to M , and add v 2 to R, and With probability 1/2, match u to v 2 , add v 1 to R, and add v 2 to M .
Let G = (U G ∪ V, E G ) be the bipartite input graph to 2PM, and let H = (U H ∪ V, E H ) be a left 2-copy of H. In the arrival order for H, the two copies of each keyword u G ∈ U arrive in sequential order.
Lemma 11. Fix a ranking σ on V . For each bidder v ∈ V , let X v be the indicator variable for the event that v is matched by Ranking on H, when the ranking is σ. 4 Let X v be the indicator variable for the event that v is matched by RankingSimulate on G, when the ranking is σ. Then
Proof. It is easy to establish the invariant that for all v ∈ V , X v = 1 if and only if RankingSimulate puts v in either M or R. Furthermore, each bidder v ∈ V is put in M or R at most once by RankingSimulate. The lemma follows because each time RankingSimulate adds a bidder v to M or R, it matches it with probability 1/2.
Theorem 12. The competitive ratio of RankingSimulate is
Proof. For a permutation σ on V , let RankingSimulate(σ) be the matching of G returned by RankingSimulate, and let Ranking(σ) be the matching of H returned by Ranking. Lemma 11 implies that, conditioned on σ, E(| RankingSimulate(σ)|) = | Ranking(σ)|/2. By Theorem 10,
Fix a bidder v ∈ V . Let P v be the profit from v obtained by RankingSimulate. Suppose that v is matched by RankingSimulate to keyword u ∈ U G . Recall that we have assumed without loss of generality that the degree of u is at least 2. Let v = v be another bidder adjacent to u. Then, given that v is matched to u, the probability that v is matched to any keyword is no greater than 1/2. Therefore, E(P v |v matched) ≥ 1/2. Hence, the expected value of the second-price matching returned by RankingSimulate is
where OP T 2P is the size of the optimal second-price matching on G.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite different from that of the more studied First-Price Ad Auctions problem, and that this discrepancy extends to the special case of 2PM, whose first-price analogue is bipartite matching. On the positive side, we have given a 2-approximation for offline 2PM and a 5. 
A Discussion of Related Models
In this section, we prove the statements claimed in the introduction regarding the relationships between the optimal solutions of our model and the strict and non-strict models of Goel et al. [14] . Given an instance A, let OP T 2P be the optimal solution value in our model; let OP T strict be the optimal solution value under the strict model; and let OP T non−strict be the optimal solution value under the non-strict model. We prove the following theorem.
The first inequality follows from the work of Goel et al.
[14], so we need only prove that OP T strict ≤ 8OP T 2P .
The core of our argument is a reduction from 2PAA to the First-Price Ad Auctions problem (1PAA), 5 in which only one bidder is chosen for each keyword and that bidder pays the minimum of its bid and its remaining budget. Given an instance A of 2PAA, we construct an instance A of 1PAA problem by replacing each bid b u,v by
Denote by OP T 1P (A ) the optimal value of the first-price model on A . The following two lemmas prove Theorem 13 by relating both OP T non−strict (A) and OP T 2P (A) to OP T 1P (A ).
Lemma 14. OP T non−strict (A) ≤ OP T 1P (A ).
Proof. For an instance A, we can view a non-strict second-price allocation of A as a pair of (partial) functions f 1 and f 2 from the keywords U to the bidders V , where f 1 maps each keyword to the bidder to which it is allocated and f 2 maps each keyword to the bidder acting as its second-price bidder. Thus, if f 1 (u) = v and f 2 (u) = v then u is allocated to v and the price v pays is b u,v . We have, for all such u, v, and v , that b u,v ≤ b u,v . We construct the first-price allocation on A defined by f 1 and claim that the value of this first-price allocation is at least the value of the non-strict allocation defined by f 1 and f 2 . It suffices to show that for any bidder v, the profit that the non-strict allocation gets from v is at most the profit that the first-price allocation gets from v, or in other words,
This inequality follows trivially from the fact that b u,f 2 (u) ≤ b u,f 1 (u) for all allocated keywords u, and hence the lemma follows.
Lemma 15. OP T 1P (A ) ≤ 8OP T 2P (A).
Proof. Given an optimal first-price allocation of A , we can assume without loss of generality that each bidder's budget can only be exhausted by the last keyword allocated to it, or, more formally, if u 1 , u 2 , . . . u k are the keywords that are allocated to a bidder v and they come in that order, then we can assume that
The reason for this is that if for some j < k,
, then we can ignore the allocation of u j+1 , . . . u k to v without losing any profit. With this assumption, we design a randomized algorithm that constructs a second-price allocation on A whose expected value in our model is at least 1/8 of the first-price allocation's value. Viewing the first-price allocation of A as a (partial) function f from the keywords U to the bidders V and denoting by s(u, v) the bidder v for which b v u = b vu , the algorithm is as follows.
Random Construction:
Randomly mark each bidder with probability 1/2. For each unmarked bidder v:
If
We claim that for the f 1 and f 2 defined by this construction, whenever f (u i ) is set to v, the profit from that allocation is b u i ,v . This is not trivial because in our model, if a bidder's remaining budget is smaller than its bid for a keyword, it changes its bid for that keyword to its remaining budget. However, one can easily verify that in all cases, if we set f 1 (u i ) = v and f 2 (u i ) = s(u i , v), the remaining budget of v is at least b u i ,v = b u i ,s(u i ,v) . Thus, the (modified) bid of f 1 (u i ) for u i is still at least the original bid of f 2 (u i ) for u i .
We claim that the expected value of the second-price allocation defined by f 1 and f 2 is at least 1/8OP T 1P (A ). For each bidder v, let X v be the random variable denoting the profit that f 1 and f 2 get from v, and let Y v be the profit that f gets from v. We have OP T 1P (A ) = v Y v , so it suffices to show that E(
Consider any v ∈ V that is unmarked. Let
Thus, in both case, we have
B Proof of Theorem 10
In this appendix, we provide a full proof of Theorem 10. The proof presented here is quite similar to the simplified proof of Theorem 8 presented by Birnbaum and Mathieu [4] . For intuition into the proof presented here, the interested reader is referred to that work. 6 Let G = (U G ∪ V, E G ) be a bipartite graph and let H = (U H ∪ V, E H ) be a left k-copy of G. Let ζ : U H → U G be a map that satisfies the conditions of Definition 9. Let M G ⊆ E G be a maximum matching of G.
Let Ranking(H, π, σ) denote the matching constructed on H for arrival order π, when the ranking is σ. Consider another process in which the vertices in V arrive in the order given by σ and are matched to the available vertex u ∈ U H that minimizes π(u). Call the matching constructed by this process Ranking (H, π, σ). It is not hard to see that these matchings are identical, a fact that is proved in [16] .
Lemma 16 (Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani [16]). For any permutations π and σ, Ranking(H, π, σ) = Ranking (H, π, σ) .
The following monotonicity lemma shows that removing vertices in H can only decrease the size of the matching returned by Ranking. Lemma 17. Let π H be an arrival order for the vertices in U H , and let σ H be a ranking on the vertices in V . Suppose that x is a vertex in U H ∪ V , and let H = (U H , V H , E H ) = H \ {x}. Let π H and σ H be the orderings of U H and V H induced by π H and σ H , respectively. Then
Proof. Suppose first that x ∈ U H . In this case, V = V H and σ H = σ H . Let Q t (H) ⊆ V be the set of vertices matched to vertices in U H that arrive at or before time t (under arrival order π H and ranking σ H ), and let Q t (H ) ⊆ V be the set of vertices matched to vertices in U H that arrive at or before time t (under arrival order π H and ranking σ H ). We prove by induction on t that Q t−1 (H ) ⊆ Q t (H), which by substituting t = n is sufficient to prove the claim. The statement holds when t = 1, since Q 0 (H ) = ∅. Now supposing we have Q t−2 (H ) ⊆ Q t−1 (H), we prove Q t−1 (H ) ⊆ Q t (H). Suppose that t is at or before the time that x arrives in π H . Then clearly Q t−1 (H ) = Q t−1 (H) ⊆ Q t (H). Now suppose that t is after the time that x arrives in π H . Let u be the vertex that arrives at time t − 1 in π H . If u is not matched by Ranking(H , π H , σ H ), then Q t−1 (H ) = Q t−2 (H ) ⊆ Q t−1 (H) ⊆ Q t (H). Now suppose that u is matched by Ranking(H , π H , σ H ), say to vertex v . We show that v ∈ Q t (H), which by the induction hypothesis, is enough to prove that Q t−1 (H ) ⊆ Q t (H). Note that u arrives at time t in π H . Let v be the vertex to which u is matched by Ranking(H, π H , σ H ). If v = v , we are done, so suppose that v = v . Since v ∈ Q t−1 (H), it follows by the induction hypothesis that v ∈ Q t−2 (H ). Therefore, vertex v is available to be matched to u when it arrives in π H . Since Ranking(H , π H , σ H ) matched u to v instead, v must have a lower rank than v in σ H . Since Ranking(H, π H , σ H ) chose v, vertex v must have already been matched when vertex u arrived at time t in π H , or, in other words, v ∈ Q t−1 (H) ⊆ Q t (H). Now suppose that x ∈ V . In this case, U H = U H and π H = π H . Let R t (H) ⊆ U H be the set of vertices matched to vertices in V that are ranked less than or equal to t (under arrival order π H and ranking σ H ), and let R t (H ) ⊆ U H be the set of vertices matched to vertices in V that are ranked less than or equal to t (under arrival order π H and ranking σ H ). Then by Lemma 16, we can apply the same argument as before to show that R t−1 (H ) ⊆ R t (H) for all t, which by substituting t = n, is sufficient to prove the claim.
We define the following notation. For all u G ∈ U G , let ζ −1 (u G ) be the set of all u H ∈ U H such that ζ(u H ) = u G , and for any subset U G ⊆ U G , let ζ −1 (U G ) be the set of all u H ∈ U H such that ζ(u H ) ∈ U G . The following lemma shows that we can assume without loss of generality that M G is a perfect matching.
Lemma 18. Let U ⊆ U G and V ⊆ V be the subset of vertices that are in M G . Let G be the subgraph of G induced by U ∪ V , and let H be the subgraph of H induced by ζ −1 (U ) ∪ V . Then the expected size of the matching produced by Ranking on H is no greater than the expected size of the matching produced by Ranking on H.
Proof. The proof follows by repeated application of Lemma 17 for all x that are not in ζ −1 (U ) ∪ V .
In light of Lemma 18, to prove Theorem 10, it is sufficient to show that the expected size of the matching produced by Ranking on H is at least (1 − 1/e 1/k − o(1))|M G |. To simplify notation, we instead assume without loss of generality that G = G , and hence G has a perfect matching. Let n = OP T 1P = |M G | = |V |. Henceforth, fix an arrival order π. To simplify notation, we write Ranking(σ) to mean Ranking(H, π, σ).
Let f : U H → V be a map such that for all v ∈ V , there are exactly k vertices u ∈ U H such that f (u) = v. The existence of such a map f follows from the assumption that G has a perfect matching. For any vertex v ∈ V let f −1 (v) be the set of u ∈ U H such that f (u) = v. We proceed with the following two lemmas.
Lemma 19. Let u ∈ U H , and let v = f (u). For any ranking σ, if v is not matched by Ranking(σ), then u is matched to a vertex whose rank is less than the rank of v in σ.
Proof. If v is not matched by Ranking(σ), then since there is an edge between u and v, it was available to be matched to u when it arrived. Therefore, by the behavior of Ranking, u must have been matched to a vertex of lower rank.
Lemma 20. Let u ∈ U H , and let v = f (u). Fix an integer t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n. Let σ be a permutation, and let σ be the permutation obtained from σ by removing vertex v and putting it back in so its rank is t. If v is not matched by Ranking(σ ), then u must be matched by Ranking(σ) to a vertex whose rank in σ is less than or equal to t.
Proof. For the proof, it is convenient to invoke Lemma 16 and consider Ranking (σ) and Ranking (σ ) instead of Ranking(σ) and Ranking(σ ). In the process by which Ranking constructs its matching, call the moment that the t th vertex in V arrives time t. For any 1 ≤ s ≤ n, let R s (σ) (resp., R s (σ )) be the set of vertices in U H matched by time s in σ (resp., σ ). By Lemma 19, if v is not matched by Ranking(σ ), then u must be matched to a vertex v in Ranking(σ ) such that σ (v ) < σ (v). Hence u ∈ R t−1 (σ ). We prove the lemma by showing that R t−1 (σ ) ⊆ R t (σ). Lett be the time that v arrives in σ. Then ift ≥ t, the two orders σ and σ are identical through time t, which implies that R t−1 (σ ) = R t−1 (σ) ⊆ R t (σ). Now, in the case thatt < t, we prove that for 1 ≤ s ≤ t, R s−1 (σ ) ⊆ R s (σ). The proof, which is similar to the proof of Lemma 17, proceeds by induction on s. When s = 0, the claim clearly holds, since R 0 (σ ) = ∅. Now, supposing that R s−2 (σ ) ⊆ R s−1 (σ), we prove that R s−1 (σ ) ⊆ R s (σ). If s ≤t, then the two orders σ and σ are identical through time s, so R s−1 (σ ) = R s−1 (σ) ⊆ R s (σ). Now suppose that s >t. Then the vertex that arrives at time s − 1 in σ is the same as the vertex that arrives at time s in σ. Call this vertex w. If w is not matched by Ranking (σ ), then R s−1 (σ ) = R s−2 (σ ), and we are done by the induction hypothesis. Now suppose that w is matched to vertex x by Ranking (σ ) and to vertex x by Ranking (σ). If x = x , then again we are done by the induction hypothesis, so suppose that x = x . Since x was available at time s − 1 in σ, we have x ∈ R s−1 (σ), and by the induction hypothesis x ∈ R s−2 (σ ). Hence, x was available at time s − 1 in σ . Since Ranking (σ ) matched w to x , it must be that π(x ) < π(x). This implies that x must be matched when w arrives at time s in σ, or in other words, x ∈ R s−1 (σ) ⊆ R s (σ). By the induction hypothesis, we are done.
Lemma 21. For 1 ≤ t ≤ n, let x t denote the probability over σ that the vertex ranked t in V is matched by Ranking(σ). Then
Proof. Let σ be permutation chosen uniformly at random, and let σ be a permutation obtained from σ by choosing a vertex v ∈ V uniformly at random, taking it out of σ, and putting it back so that its rank is t. Note that both σ and σ are distributed uniformly at random among all permutations. Let u be a vertex chosen uniformly at random from f −1 (v). Note that conditioned on σ, u is equally likely to be any of the kn vertices in U H . Let R t be the set of vertices in U H that are matched by Ranking(σ) to a vertex of rank t or lower in σ. Lemma 20 states that if v is not matched by Ranking(σ ), then u ∈ R t . The expected size of R t is 1≤s≤t x s . Hence, the probability that u ∈ R t , conditioned on σ, is (1/(kn)) 1≤s≤t x s . The lemma follows because the probability that v is not matched by Ranking(σ ) is 1 − x t .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 10.
Proof of Theorem 10. For 0 ≤ t ≤ n, let S t = 1≤s≤t x s . Then the expected size of the matching returned by Ranking on H is S n . Rearranging (1) yields, for 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
which by induction implies that S t ≥ 1≤s≤t (kn/(kn + 1)) s , and hence
C Other Missing Proofs
In this appendix, we provide the missing proofs from the body of the paper.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Fix a constant c > c, and let n 0 be the smallest integer such that for all n ≥ n 0 , c · c(n 5 + n + 2)
and n/2 + 1 2 ≥ c .
Note that since n 0 depends only on c , it is a constant. We reduce from PARTITION, in which the input is a set of n ≥ n 0 items, and the weight of the i-th item is given by w i . If W = n i=1 w i , then the question is whether there is a partition of the items into two subsets of size n/2 such that the sum of the w i 's in each subset is W/2. It is known that this problem (even when the subsets must both have size n/2) is NP-hard [13] .
Suppose that there is an m/c -approximation algorithm to 2PAA(c); we will show that constructing the following instance of 2PAA(c) (illustrated in Figure 4 ) allows us to use the m/capproximation to solve the PARTITION instance:
• First, create n + 2 keywords c 1 , . . . , c n , e 1 , e 2 . Second, create an additional set
of cn 2 keywords. The keywords arrive in the order c 1 , . . . , c n , e 1 , e 2 , g 1,1 , . . . , g 1,c , . . . . . . , g n 2 ,1 , . . . , g n 2 ,c .
• Create n 2 + 4 bidders a, d 1 , d 2 , f, h 1 , . . . , h n 2 . Set the budgets of a, d 1 , and d 2 to cW (1 + n/2). Set the budget of f to cW (n 3 + 1). For 1 ≤ i ≤ n 2 , set the budget of h i to cW n 3 .
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, bidders a, d 1 , and d 2 bid c(w i + W ) on keyword c i .
• For j ∈ {1, 2}, bidder d j bids cW on keyword e j . Bidder f bids cW/2 on both e 1 and e 2 .
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ n 2 and 1 ≤ k ≤ c, keyword g i,k receives a bid of W (n 3 + 1) from bidder f and a bid of W n 3 from bidder h i .
This reduction can clearly be performed in polynomial time. Furthermore, it can easily be checked that (3) implies that no bidder bids more than 1/c of its budget on any keyword. We first show that if the PARTITION instance is a "yes" instance, then there exists a feasible solution to the 2PAA(c) instance of value at least cW (n 5 + n + 2). Let U ⊆ [n] be such that |U | = n/2 and i∈U w i = i∈U w i = W/2.
We construct a solution to the 2PAA(c) instance as follows. For every i ∈ U , allocate c i to d 1 , and for every i ∈ U , allocate c i to d 2 . For each of these allocations, choose a as the second-price bidder. This will reduce the budget of d 1 and d 2 to exactly cW/2, and hence the bids from d 1 to e 1 and from d 2 to e 2 will be both be reduced to cW/2. Allocate e 1 to f choosing d 1 as the second-price bidder, and allocate e 2 to f choosing d 2 as the second-price bidder. This will reduce the budget of f to cW n 3 . The profit from the solution constructed so far is cW (n+2). Now allocate g 1,1 , g 1,2 , . . . , g 1,c−1 to f , choosing h 1 as the second-price bidder. This will reduce the budget of f . . . . . . to W n 3 . Hence, it can act as the second-price bidder for each of the remaining keywords in G. Allocate g 1,c to h 1 , choosing f as the second-price bidder, and then, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n 2 and 1 ≤ k ≤ c, allocate g i,k to h i , choosing f as the second-price bidder. The profit obtained for each keyword in G in this assignment is W n 3 . Since |G| = cn 2 , the total profit of the solution constructed is cW (n + 2) + cW n 5 = cW (n 5 + n + 2).
We now show that if there is a second-price matching in the 2PAA(c) instance of value at least cW (n 3 + cn 2 + n + 2), then there must be a partition of w 1 , . . . , w n . In such a matching, at most cW (n + 2) units of profit can be obtained from keywords c 1 , . . . , c n , e 1 , e 2 , since the initial secondhighest bids on those keywords sum to cW (n + 2). Hence, at least cW (n 3 + cn 2 ) profit must come from the keywords in G.
Suppose that the budget of f is greater than cW n 3 after keywords e 1 and e 2 are allocated. Note that at least c of the keywords in G must be allocated to reach a profit of cW (n 3 + cn 2 ) on these keywords. Consider what happens after the first c of the keywords in G are assigned. For each of these keywords, f must have been the first-price bidder, so its budget is reduced to an amount greater than 0 and less than or equal to cW . Hence, for each keyword in G allocated henceforth, f is the second-price bidder, and the profit is at most cW . Since there are at most c(n 2 − 1) more keywords in G, the total profit from the keywords in G is at most cW n 3 + c 2 W (n 2 − 1), which contradicts the fact that at least cW (n 3 + cn 2 ) units of profit must come from G. Hence, we conclude that the budget of f is less than or equal to cW n 3 after keywords e 1 and e 2 are allocated.
The budget of f can only be smaller than cW n 3 if f acts as the first-price bidder for both e 1 and e 2 . But this can happen only if the budgets of both d 1 and d 2 are reduced to an amount less than or equal to cW/2. For j ∈ {1, 2}, let U j ⊆ [n] be the set of indices i such that d j acts as the first-price bidder for i. For both j, we have that
Rearranging (4) yields i∈U j W ≥ W/2+W n/2− i∈U j w i , which implies W |U j | ≥ W/2+W n/2− W , and hence |U j | ≥ n/2 − 1/2. By integrality, then, |U j | ≥ n/2 for both j. Hence |U j | = n/2 for both j, and using (4) again, we have i∈U j cw i + cW |U j | ≥ cW/2 + cW n/2 which implies that i∈U j w i ≥ W/2 for both j. Therefore, the partition defined by U 1 and U 2 is a solution to the PARTITION instance.
To conclude the proof, note that the number of keywords in the 2PAA(c) instance is cn 2 + n + 2. Hence, if the PARTITION instance is a "yes" instance, then by (2), we can run the m/capproximation algorithm to find a second-price matching of value at least cW (n 3 + cn 2 + n + 2), and if the PARTITION instance is a "no" instance, then the value of the solution returned by the algorithm must be strictly less than cW (n 3 +cn 2 +n+2). Hence, an m/c -approximation algorithm for 2PAA(c) can be used to solve PARTITION.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof is by a reduction from vertex cover. Given a graph G, we construct an instance f (G) of 2PM as follows. First, for each edge e ∈ E(G), we create a keyword with the same label (called an edge keyword ), and for each vertex v ∈ V (G), we create a bidder with the same label (called a vertex bidder ). Bidder v bids for keyword e if vertex v is one of the two end points of edge e. (Recall that in 2PM, if a bidder makes a non-zero bid for a keyword, that bid is 1.) In addition, for each edge e, we create a unique bidder x e who also bids for e. Furthermore, for each vertex v, we create a gadget containing two keywords h v and l v and two bidders y v and z v . We let v and y v bid for h v ; and y v and z v bid for l v . The keywords arrive in an order such that for each v ∈ V (G), keyword h v comes before l v , and the edge keywords arrive after all of the h v 's and l v 's have arrived. An example of this reduction is shown in Figure 5 .
The following lemma provides the basis of the proof.
Lemma 22. Let OP T V C and OP T 2P be the size of the minimum vertex cover of G and the maximum second-price matching on f (G), respectively. Then
Proof. We first show that given a vertex cover S of size OP T V C of G, we can construct a solution to the 2PM instance whose value is 2|V (G)| + |E(G)| − OP T V C . For each vertex v / ∈ S, we allocate h v to v (with y v acting as the second-price bidder) and l v to y v (with z v acting as the second-price bidder), getting a profit of 2 from the gadget for v. For each vertex v ∈ S, we allocate h v to y v (with v acting as the second-price bidder) and ignore l v , getting a profit of 1 from the gadget for v. We then allocate each edge keyword e to x e . During each of these edge keyword allocations, at least one of the two vertex bidders that bid for e is still available, since S is a vertex cover. Hence, for each of these allocations, there is a bidder that can act as a second-price bidder, and the profit from the allocation is 1. This allocation yields a second-price matching of size To show that OP T 2P ≤ 2|V (G)| + |E(G)| − OP T V C , we start with an optimal solution to f (G) of value OP T 2P and construct a vertex cover of G of size 2|V (G)| + |E(G)| − OP T 2P . To do this, we first claim that there exists an optimal solution of f (G) in which every edge-keyword is allocated for a profit of 1. Consider any optimal second-price matching of the instance. Let e be an edge-keyword e that is not allocated for a profit of 1. If it is adjacent to a vertex bidder that is unassigned when e arrives, then e can be allocated to x e for a profit of 1, which can only increase the value of the solution. Suppose, on the other hand, that both of its vertex bidders are not available when e arrives. Let v be a vertex bidder that bids for e. Since it is not available, h v must have been allocated to v. We can transform this second-price matching to another one in which h v is assigned to y v , l v is ignored and e is assigned to x e , with v acting the second-price bidder in both cases. This does not decrease the total profit of the solution. Hence, we can perform these transformations for each edge keyword e that is not allocated for a profit of 1 until we obtain a new optimal solution in which each edge keyword is allocated for a profit of 1.
Now consider an optimal second-price matching in which all edge keywords are allocated for a profit of 1. Let T ⊆ V (G) be the set of vertices represented by vertex bidders that are not allocated any keywords in this second-price matching. Then |T | = 2|V (G)| + |E(G)| − |OP T 2P |, and T is a vertex cover, which implies OP T V C ≤ 2|V (G)| + |E(G)| − OP T 2P . The lemma follows. Now, suppose that we have an α-approximation for 2PM. We will show how to use this approximation algorithm and our reduction to obtain an ((8α − 7)/α)-approximation for Vertex Cover on 4-regular graphs. By Theorem 3, this means that (8α − 7)/α ≥ 53/52, and hence α ≥ 364/363, unless P = N P .
To construct this ((8α − 7)/α)-approximation algorithm, given a 4-regular graph G, run the above reduction to obtain a 2PM instance f (G). Then use the α-approximation to obtain a secondprice matching M whose value is at least OP T 2P /α. Now, just as in the proof of Lemma 22, we can assume that in M , every edge keyword e is allocated to x e . Hence, the set of vertices T associated with the vertex bidders that are not allocated a keyword form a vertex cover, and
Since G is 4-regular, we have OP T V C ≥ m/4 = (2|V (G)|+|E(G)|)/8, and hence by (5), we conclude that |T | ≤ ((8α − 7)/α)OP T V C , which finishes the proof of the theorem.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Since the number of vertices matched by f is an upper bound on the profit of the maximum secondprice matching on G, we need only to prove that the second-price matching contains at least half of the keywords matched by f . By the behavior of the algorithm, it is clear that whenever a vertex u is matched to f (u) in the second-price matching, the profit obtained is 1. Furthermore, every time an an edge is removed from f , a new keyword is added to the second-price matching. Thus, the theorem follows.
C.4 Proof of Theorem 7
We invoke Yao's Principle [27] and construct a distribution of inputs for which the best deterministic algorithm achieves an expected performance of (asymptotically) 1/2 the value of the optimal solution. Our distribution is constructed as follows. The first keyword arrives, and it is adjacent to two bidders. Then the second keyword arrives, and it is adjacent to one of the two bidders adjacent to the first keyword, chosen uniformly at random, as well as a new bidder; then the third keyword arrives, and it is adjacent to one of the bidders adjacent to the second keyword, chosen uniformly at random, as well as a new bidder; and so on, until the m-th keyword arrives. We call this a normal instance. To analyze the performance of the online algorithms, we also define a restricted instance to be one that is exactly the same as a normal instance except that one of the two bidders of the first keyword is marked unavailable, i.e., he can not participate in any auction.
Clearly, an offline algorithm that knows the random choices beforehand can allocate each keyword to the bidder that will not be adjacent to the keyword that arrives next. In this way, it can ensure that for each keyword, there is a bidder that can act as a second-price bidder. Hence for a normal instance, the optimal second-price matching obtains a profit of m.
Consider the algorithm Greedy, which allocates a keyword to an arbitrary adjacent bidder if and only if there is another available bidder to act as a second-price bidder. Our proof consists of two steps: first, we will show that the expected performance of Greedy on the normal instance is (m + 1)/2, and second we will prove that Greedy is the best algorithm in expectation for both types of instances.
Let X * k and Y * k be the expected profit of Greedy on a normal and a restricted instance of k keywords, respectively (where X * 0 and Y * 0 are both defined to be 0). Given the first keyword of a normal instance, Greedy allocates it to an arbitrary bidder. Then, with probability 1/2, it is faced with a normal instance of k − 1 keywords, and with probability 1/2, it is faced with a restricted instance of k − 1 keywords. Therefore, for all integers k ≥ 1,
On the other hand, given the first keyword of a restricted instance, Greedy just waits for the second keyword. Then, with probability 1/2, the second keyword chooses the marked bidder, giving Greedy a restricted instance of k−1 keywords, and with probability 1/2, the second keyword chooses the unmarked bidder, giving Greedy a normal instance of k − 1 keywords. Therefore, for all k,
From (6) and (7) we have, for all k,
Plugging (8) 
and hence, by induction X * m = (m + 1)/2. Now, we prove that Greedy is the best among all algorithms on these two types of instances. In fact, we make it easier for the algorithms by telling them beforehand how many keywords in the instance they will need to solve. Let X m and Y m be the expected number of keywords in the second-price matching produced by the best algorithms that "know" that they are solving a normal instance of size m and a restricted instance of size m, respectively. Let A m and B m denote these optimal algorithms.
We prove that X m ≤ X * m and Y m ≤ Y * m for all m by induction. The base case in which m = 1 is easy, since no algorithm can obtain a profit of more than one on a normal instance of one keyword or more than zero on a restricted instance of one keyword. We now prove the induction step.
First, consider A m . When the first keyword arrives, A m has two choices: either ignore it or allocate it to one of the bidders. If A m ignores the first keyword, its performance is at most the performance of A m−1 on the remaining keywords, which constitute a normal instance of m − 1 keywords. On the other hand, if A m allocates the first keyword to one of the bidders, then with probability 1/2, it is faced with a normal instance of m − 1 keywords, and with probability 1/2 it is faced with a restricted instance of m − 1 keywords. The performance of A m on these instance is at most the performance of A m−1 and B m−1 , respectively. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, (8) , and (9), we have Next, consider B m . When the first keyword arrives, B m cannot allocate it for a profit. If it allocates it for a profit of 0, then it is faced with a restricted instance of m − 1 keywords. If it does not allocate the keyword, then with probability 1/2, B m is faced with a normal instance of m − 1 keywords, and with probability 1/2, it is faced with a restricted instance of m − 1 keywords. Its performance on these instances is at most those of A m−1 and B m−1 , respectively. Thus, by the induction hypothesis and (7) This completes our proof.
